As flood waters start to recede they have been replaced by a different flood; the flood of blame and recrimination. A number of journalists have been quick to lay blame in several areas, including the meteorological office, the disaster management centre and the government. However, whilst journalists and politicians wasted time looking for scapegoats others got on with a much more important job; getting help and aid to the flood victims
The government would have it that the flood was the result of all those poor people who built on marshland. As a result they have said that they will be removing upwards of 2500 families from unauthorised sites; (see Sunday Times 12th June) This is either ignorance or political sophistry.
“The squatter families will not be offered compensation or alternative locations, Sri Lanka Land Reclamation and Development Corporation (SLRDC) Chairmnan W.M.A.S. Iddawala told the Sunday Times. He said that in a survey carried out after last month’s devastating floods, the corporation had identified the squatter families which should be evicted.” Sunday Times
While some properties may have inhibited the flow of flood water in and around the canals they did not cause the flood.
Building on marshland does not cause a flood. It might put people in harm’s way, but it doesn’t cause a flood to happen.The sheer volume of water falling on an unprotected catchment is what caused the flood.
So why the evictions? We can only guess
- it is always convenient to have a scapegoat to divert attention away from the failings of the government and its officials
- they will not have to pay compensation to these families
- it is part of a broader government strategy of relocating families in unauthorised settlements into the government built apartment complexes currently springing up around the city
A vulnerable population
A good place to start is to define what vulnerable means in this context. Two aspects need to be borne in mind;
- the immediate physical vulnerability to the danger of flood
- the longer term vulnerability to the economic impacts of the flood
Why were so many people exposed to this devastating flood and its longer term impacts? A number of factors contributed to render the population vulnerable;
- The areas around Colombo are low-lying and flood prone
- there are no effective flood defences in place to control the Kelani Ganga
- Suburban population densities are high quite close to the main river and its tributaries
Population densities in the Colombo area source: researchgate
- Housing density is high and many of the side lanes are narrow which would later hamper rescue and relief efforts
- Most households are in the lower middle to low income bracket and not able to withstand the financial impact of losses due to the flood
- How many had adequate insurance cover? None; as one person told me; “it isn’t in the Sri Lankan culture to purchase home insurance”
In all more than 150,000 people were temporarily displaced by the flood. Although relatively few homes were completely lost many have suffered water damage, small shops kades and bakehouses have lost their stocks of goods to sell, livelihoods have been wrecked, many have lost all their possessions in the flood and will find it hard t replace them.
This is Imi’s story. She lives with her mother and infirm grandparents in Welivita, part of Kaduwela to the north-east of the city. This is what the flood meant to families such as hers.
The Disaster Management Centre should have been the body to co-ordinate flood relief efforts. However, at the height of the flood it was under 2 metres of water; not ideal. They did warn of the impending flood and they did issue evacuation alerts and to be fair other measures were put in place once the flood struck:
- 1500 military personnel were organised into 81 teams and deployed to the flood areas, as were the police
- boats were provided to rescue trapped households from roofs and upper stories
- safe areas were identified and evacuation centres set up
- rescued families were transported to the evacuation sites where there were emergency rations, blankets etc
However, good as this was there doesn’t seem to have been much coordination of the relief effort. The President did instruct the local officials the Grama Niladahri to visit all affected areas and people in their districts to get an idea of what the problems were, and who was in most need of help but according to this Sunday Times report the response was at best patchy.
and there were problems:
- some evacuation centres were overrun and became heavily congested
- the emergency relief packages were pitifully small and not everyone got them
- there was a mismatch in terms of what was needed and what was given; victims urgently needed clothing, sanitary wear and medicines; they didn’t receive much of any of these
- there were not enough boats available to rescue people
- some houses, especially the less accessible, were never visited by the rescuers
- calls for help made to the disaster centres went unanswered in some cases. For many help never came.
Questions have also been raised about where all the foreign aid went because it certainly didn’t reach many of the victims if newspaper reports are to be believed. This from the Sunday Times 12th June:
“Three weeks after floods ravaged many of the areas adjoining the Kelani river communities are waiting for the government machinery to move in to provide aid, rebuild houses and provide other relief. Flood victims stranded in Kelaniya, Kelanimulla and Angoda areas, this week, claimed there was no responsible officer at grassroots level to monitor the process of distributing dry rations to the destitute.”
In the vacuum left by what some see as government ineptitude local volunteer groups sprung up in different districts across the city. One such group was the Welivita volunteers. Initially they came together to help their friend Imi (see above) However, they could see the need for a wider effort and within in a short time they:
- organised themselves into a coherent group with a steering commitee
- created a facebook page for the group
- visited the area to get an idea of the extent of the problem
- went to the local Grama Niladhari (government official) to identify the families most in need
- launched an online campaign on facebook for donations
- put out regular bulletins on the progress of donations
- itemised a list of essential items for relief packs and school packs; all costed out; each cost around 5000 rupees and was paid for by donations. (the value of government aid packs was 1500 rupees and wasnt necessarily what people wanted or needed)
- collected the packs and then distributed to needy families
- when that was done they embarked on a clean up of Imi’s house and the areas nearby
They did this in the space of two weeks: and you can check out their page Welivita Volunteers where you will get full details on what they did, how they did it and also a good selection of photos which graphically illustrate their work;
So the point about their work was that it was:
- carefully structured and organised throughout
- bureaucracy was kept at a minimum
- targeted at those in most need
- delivered quickly and without fuss into the hands of the needy
- not expensive
After the 2004 Tsunami the people were told that in future the government would be ready; those scenes of chaos in 2004 could not happen again..that does not seem to be the case. Looking through recent newspaper articles it would seem that the government effort raises more questions than answers;
- Where did all the emergency aid go? Many complain that they have not seen any of it.
- Journalists slate the government for complacency and inactivity
- Why was the Disaster Management Centre located in a flood prone area? It is worth noting that millions of rupees worth of telecommunications equipment stored at the DMC has also been ruined in the flood
- Where was the co-ordination necessary to mount a coherent disaster management plan.. indeed where was the plan?
After events like this one governments all over the world (certainly in the UK) drone on about lessons to be learned.. evidence is that those lessons are rarely learned. However, there are some take away points:
- Maybe it is time to look at flood prevention especially in the upper Kelani basin. It will be expensive in the short run but will save in the longer term. Have a look at flood prevention schemes on the Los Angeles and San Gabriel rivers, in Los Angeles, USA for an example. flood retention dams in the upper course, flood spreading zomes in the lower course, channel improvements, engineering of the channel of the kelaqni, raising the river banks.. these could all be looked at.
- By all means give people alternatives to living in marshy areas and on the banks of the Kelani, but these should be viable alternatives and in consultation with those living in those areas.
- A proper disaster management contingency plan for flooding needs to be in place. Military personnel need to be trained. Boats need to be available.
- There needs to be someone of ministerial rank in charge of flood relief; clearly the DMC is not up to the job.
- There needs to be some recognition that roles need to be specialised.
There are two stages to a flood event like this:
Initially the need is for search and rescue; the military are best placed to do this; I suspect that if they had been in charge the rescue operation would have been properly coordinated and way more efficient. They have the helicopters to overfly flooded areas and provide first hand intelligence to direct the rescue effort plus they have a command network that would be effective in these situations
- Once rescue is underway the focus is on relief and the government could learn a great deal from the work of the local volunteers; how they organised themselves, targeted relief on those in greatest need, paid heed to what the victims needed and so on.
- They might also consider how they might utilise the power of social media to better direct their efforts.
- They could think of building on the huge amount of good will shown by local people to the victims by setting up local part time or volunteer flood relief groups who could be trained as a first line of the relief effort and mobilised at times of flood.
One thing is for sure; the river will flood again whether people are living on marshland or not. The question as ever, is will the government be ready?